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"All moral evidence, .. . all confidence in human veracity, must
be weakened by apostasy, and overthrown by total infidelity."
Cooley alludes to "the old notion that truth and a sense of duty do not
consort with skepticism in religion." This "old notion" was held be-
cause the teachings of the clergy were to the effect that (a) if one
does not believe in divine punishments he is likely to do ill, and (b)
if he does not believe in God he cannot seek help from Him and
therefore becomes amenable to the control of a personal Devil. Lord
Coke believed "infidels" to be the "subjects" of "the Devil."3  To
disbelieve in the Devil was deemed to be as dangerous as to deny
the being of a Deity. Accordingly Adam Clarke, the great com-
mentator on the Bible, wrote:'
"By leading men to disbelieve and deny his (the Devil's) existence,
he throws them off their guard; and is their complete master, and they are
led captive by him at his will."
It was usual for common law indictments to incorporate the
words: "not having the fear of God before his eyes, but being moved
and seduced by the instigation of the devil." The Supreme Court of
North Carolina apparently took judicial notice of the existence of a
personal Devil when it declared:"
"To know the right and still the wrong pursue, proceeds from a
perverse will brought about by the seduction of the evil one, but which
nevertheless, with the aids that lie within our reach, as we are taught
to believe, may be resisted and overcome, .
It was once almost universal that if any one avowed a disbelief
in a personal Devil and denied that the Almighty watches each indi-
vidual so as to reward or punish him according to his deserts, he was
denominated an "infidel," and to be so known was to become, as a
iMember of the Denver, Colo. bar.
2Book IV, p. 44.
3Calvin's Case, 4 Coke's R. 33, cited in Haim v. Bridalut, 37 Miss. 209,
226. 4Adam Clarke, LL.D., F.S.A., Commentary on Job 1:6.
5State v. Brando, 8 Jones, 463, 467.
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Connecticut court solemnly observed,6 "odious and detestable." Judges
were as willing to denounce the unbeliever when speaking advisedly
in their judicial capacity as they were when freely voicing their senti-
ments as private individuals. It is a curious fact that the opportunity
to do so never came by reason of a murderer, a rapist, or some other
criminal being suspected of some heterodoxy in his theology, but
always the pious judicial invective was directed against some unof-
fending litigant, witness, or juror. A few cases will be presently
cited.
Charles Koppee obtained a judgment in a civil action for dam-
ages against S. K. Odell in a justice court. The defendant appealed
to the Circuit Court, and being there unsuccessful, he took an appeal
to the Supreme Court. That tribunal remanded the cause for new
trial upon the ground that the Circuit Court had committed preju-
dicial error in refusing to permit Odell to show that Koppee "disbe-
lieved in God or a future state of rewards and punishments." In
addition to being thus deprived of the results of the time and expense
of the two trials, Koppee was compelled to receive the stigmatization
contained in the following words of the Supreme Court of Tennessee :7
"The man who has the hardihood to avow that he does not believe
in a God, shows a recklessness of moral character and utter want of
moral sensibility, such as very little entitles him to be heard or believed
in a court of justice in a country designated as Christian."
The appellate court of New Hampshire used similar language:8
"He who openly and deliberately avows that he has no belief in the
existence of a God, is unworthy of any credit in a court of
justice."
The courts were referring to the God of the then orthodox
Christians, now commonly called Fundamentalists; they had in mind,
according to their beliefs, a personal, punishing and rewarding Deity.
So positive and emphatic was the New Hampshire court in making
the statement quoted that the opinion was filed as one "per curiarn,"
which indicates that every member treated the expression in question
as if it was his own, or if axiomatic, and which ought not, therefore,
to be credited to the judicial reasoning or to the acumen of any one
particular judge. If the court had possessed modern sociological and
6Stow v. Coniverse, 3 Conn. 325, 342 (1820). "If believed, it can scarcely
fail to deprive him of the esteem of mankind, exclude him from intercourse
with men of piety and virtue, and render him odious and detestable."
7Odell v. Koppee, 5 Heisk. 88.
sNorton v. Ladd, 4 N. H. 444.
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psychological knowledge relevant to the subject, and if it had been
affected by a sense of justice and humanity towards those whose
minds compelled them to be non-religious, it would have declared that
the ancient common law presumed that an unbeliever is "unworthy,"
etc., and that the court must, since such law was adopted in the state,
hold likewise. But the judges solemnly and forcefully proclaimed
it to be an actual fact, not a mere juristic fiction, that an unbeliever
is "unworthy of any credit." Since the court made that statement
of what it regarded as a fact, without evidence, it could have added
that it took judicial notice of such assumed fact, just as judicial notice
has been taken, without proof, of facts of elementary knowledge.
It is impossible to say what remedy, if any, a wronged litigant
would have had against a verbose judge who had published against
him such an aspersion as that made in the Tennessee opinion. If
any prosecuting attorney, willing to imperil his political prestige,
should file a criminal information against the judicial culprit, the
defendant might adopt the cowardly course of hiding behind the
technical skirt of "privilege." To escape a just verdict, assuming
such verdict possible, he would invoke the rule than an official is not
civilly or criminally liable for words published in the course of a
judicial proceeding, regardless of his malice or the falsity of his
utterances. 9
It is reasonable to suppose that a juror, who is not responsible
for the litigation in which he serves and has not solicited his position,
will not be assailed by any court on account of any opinion not per-
taining to the issues at the trial. Yet one of the Judges of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee attacked an unoffending juror, who had
agreed with his associates- by aspersing him and his class. It was
in a case where the evidence showed "clear and aggravated murder"
on the part of the defendant, and this juror voted to convict. The
judge in question desired that the appellate court grant the murderer
a new trial because a clergyman, at the request of the murderer, was
willing to testify that this faithful juror was an "atheist." The jurist
in question invoked the law that the juror could not "hold any office
. . . because he cannot take an oath-he cannot be trusted." The
dutiful citizen was referred to as "an evil genius, in a sacred place."
10
On two different occasions the -Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
declared that a hall devoted to the "free discussion of religion"
Mundy v. McDonald (Mich. 1921) 185 N. W. 877.
lOM'Clure v. State, 1 Yerger (9 Tenn.) 207.
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"would prove a nursery of vice, a school of preparation to qualify
young men for the gallows and young women for the brothel.""
Thus there has existed, if it does not still exist, a situation
wherein a judge may calumniate with impunity, under the pretext of
rendering an official and an advised judicial opinion, a party, witness,
or juror whose opinions in matters of religion are different from
those he himself professes to hold. Once a judicial libel is promul-
gated, it is allowed to travel on, and be quoted by laymen, without
retraction by the court in which it originated, and without criticism
by any other tribunal.
At the present time, due to the widespread unbelief among the
educated classes, the courts are not disposed to cast aspersions upon
the non-religious, except mildly. For example, an Alabama court
declares that to say "there is no God, . . . proves one a fool.'
1 2
It has always been the practice of the courts not to offend any sect
of Christians, and to prevent counsel from so doing. It seems that
finally the non-religious are also protected, at least to some extent.
Accordingly an appellate court in California reversed a judgment be-
cause counsel for the prevailing party used this language of and
concerning one of the adverse counsel :13
"In all my experience in life I am yet to find one single person who
openly and avowedly does not believe in God and that man didn't have
a frozen, poisoned, shriveled lump where his heart ought to be."
If an unoffending class of our citizens have been judicially and
otherwise libeled, it is the duty of the bar and of legal periodicals to
refute the libels, in justice to the class stigmatized wrongfully.
An examination of unbiased works on criminology, sociology,
psychology and ethics, in so far as they discuss the question whether
morality is dependent on the belief in divine punishments, would tend
to show that the Tennessee court was proceeding upon a false prem-
ise, and would support the conclusion that Koppee's supposed opin-
ions in matters of religion were not calculated to make him become
such a liar or demon as the court's opinion suggests. Moreover,
there are criminal statistics extant which tend to show that such a
brand of irreligion as was attributed to Koppee by his adversary is
less likely to produce crime or encourage deceit than is religion, in
its doctrinal aspects, which the judge speaking for the appellate court
probably professed.
"1Updegraph v. Cont., 11 S. & R. 394; Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. St. 465.
12Wright v. State, 135 So. 636.
"3Peacock v. Levy, 299 Pac. 790.
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When belief in divine punishments was almost universal, no
writer undertook to show that there- coild:be either public or private
morality without such a belief. There -was a general acquiescence in
the teachings of the clergy to the effect that morality was dependent
on religion and that true religion requires a.belief in divine rewards
and punishments. However, when such a belief became weakened,
unbelieving writers were tempted to assail the old theory. It is ofily
in recent years that the subject has been given consideration. Thus
in a late book'by Prof. Harry Elmer Barnes the author refers to an
investigation "directed'by -Prof. -Hugh Hartshorne of Columbia and
Prof. Mark A. May of -Yale University," and states that: their Studies
in Deceit "indicated that orthodox religious training, either Christian
or Jewish, did :not promote honesty and reliability."1
Mr. -Franklin Steiner has in recent years conducted investiga-
tions in this country and produces statistics to show that the- minimum
of criminality, exists among -the non-religious, people, and that nearly
all'the convicts in the, penal t institutions profess to believe according
to some Christian sect.15
Prof. Havelock Ellis observed that "in all countries religion, or
stiperstition, is closely related with crime," and that "among 200
Italian: murderers, Ferri, did not find one -who was irreligious."1 In
one of the latest works on Medical -Jurisprudence, Prof. 'Herzog
says :17
"In -a survey of ,100,000 each, of Protestants, -Catholics, Jews, and
,persons not adherents of -any religion the ratio of crimes committed -was
as follows: Protestants, 308.6; Catholics, 416.5; Jews, 212.7; nonreligious
persons, 84.2."
'William Adrian Bonger, cited by Prof. Herzog, made calculations,
based upon the criminal statistics, of more than 126,000 individuals
sentenced during the period .from 1901 to 1909 in the Netherlands,
with the- result that the minimum of criminality in all crimes without
exception is shown by the irreligious.28 Prof. Maurice Parmelee in-
corporates the results of Bonger's investigations into his own book1
He also says- that "so far as reliable statistics are available they dis-
prove this assertion on the part of the religionists" that "irreligion is
a potent force for crime."
14Twilight of Christianity, p. 100.
IsReligion and Roguery (The Truth Seeker Co., N. Y. 1924).
1BThe Criminal.
27Published in 1931 by'Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis. See section 843.
IsCrininality and Economic Conditions (Boston, 1916), p. 209.
29Critninology, p. 108.
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If it is claimed, as it may justly be, that criminal statistics show-
ing a greater prevalence of crime among believers than among athe-
ists do not constitute evidence either for or against one class or the
other, because criminality is produced by various factors, then it may
be observed that such statistics have been eagerly invoked by re-
ligious sects who happen to be favored by them. "In the quarrels
among the denominations, the kind and number of convictions are
quoted to show the inferiority of the opposing sect. ' 20 As a matter
of fact criminal statistics do show that religion, apart from the
influence of its teachers, does not weaken the factors which cause
deceit or crime. The Jew has less hell and fewer doctrines in his
theology than has the Fundamentalist Christian, and yet when Prof.
Herzog explains "why the Jew is much less apt to steal" than is the
Christian says that it is because of "the greater frugality of the Jew.
'21
Prof. Hans Gross in Criminal Psychology seeks to minimize the
importance of the statistics by claiming that many of the criminals
are only nominal adherents of religious bodies. Be that as it may,
these "nominal" adherents are still believers in some form of Divine
surveillance and punishments. The avowed unbeliever against whose
character judicial and non-judicial aspersions have been made is not
even a "nominal" member of any religious denomination. The sta-
tistics are still in his favor.
Dr. Lombroso, the eminent criminologist, says :22
"If we rely upon the somewhat limited statistics available in this
matter, we shall find that there are fewer criminals where atheists abound,
than where, under equal conditions, either Catholics or Protestants
dominate."
Prof. Leuba declares, in effect, that his investigations disclosed
the unbelievers to be morally better persons, as a general rule, than
the believers in a God.
23
It is needless to multiply the authorities. Any professional man
knows that the atheist is discovered, not by his conduct, but by his
expressions of opinion. Lawyers know that the average perjurer is
not one who is suspected of some heterodoxy in religion. A Federal
court referred to Mrs. Rosika Schwimmer as one who "stated she
was an absolute atheist.124 Mr. Tustice Holmes referred to her as
2ODr. Gustav Aschaffenburg, Crime, and Its Repression (Little, Brown &
Co., Boston, 1913).2 1Medical Jurisprudence, sec. 834.2 2Criine, Its Causes and Remedies (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1918),
p. 292.
23Belief in God and Immortality (Win. Morrow & Co., N. Y. 1916), p. 322.
24Macintosh v. U. S., 42 Fed. 2d., 845, 849.
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"a woman of superior character and intelligence, obviously more than
ordinarily desirable as a citizen of the United States."25  Whatever
the situation once may have been, there is not now any ground for
assuming that one's conduct is made either better or worse by reason
of what he believes as to supernatural rewards and punishments.
This is a matter of common knowledge to most educated people, but
there may be Fundamentalists who cling to the ancient theory and
prejudice, and a discussion of this kind is still timely.
Words imputing a lack of moral character or want of veracity
to a class are just as libelous as they would be if directed against
particular individuals. It is just as much a criminal libel if a non-
religious person is the victim as it is when aspersions are made against
one on account of his belief in, for example, the doctrine of transub-
stantiation. Moreover, it is more cowardly to assail a supposedly
inarticulate minority than it is to slander an orthodox and respectable
group, for the libeler knows that the latter has both the power and the
inclination to punish its defamers. Atheists are just as much entitled
to have their calumniators criminally prosecuted, or at least publicly
refuted, as are members of religious organizations. The latter have,
and successfully, invoked the criminal law of libel against talebearers
with stories of alleged escaped nuns,26 and against writers who claimed
to be exposing treasonable oaths at the risk of their own lives.27
25U. S. v. Schwhimner, 279 U. S. 644, 653.
26State v. Hosiner, 72 Or. 57, 142 Pac. 581.
27Cra,:e v. State, 14 Okla. Critn. Rep. 30, i66 Pac. 1110. 19 A. L. R. 1455.
